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Résumé / Abstract 
 
En utilisant une nouvelle base de données de credit default swaps, nous étudions les relations entre les 
déterminants théoriques du risque de défaut et la prime actuelle du marché en utilisant la régression 
linéaire. Ces déterminants théoriques sont le niveau d’endettement de la firme, la volatilité et le taux 
d’intérêt sans risque. Nous trouvons que les coefficients estimés pour ces variables sont en accord avec 
la théorie et que les estimations sont fortement significatives aussi bien statistiquement 
qu’économiquement. Le pouvoir explicatif de ces variables théoriques sur le niveau de la prime du 
default swap est d’environ 60 %. Le pouvoir explicatif sur les différences de prime est de 23 %.La 
volatilité et le niveau d’endettement en eux-mêmes ont aussi un pouvoir explicatif substantiel pour la 
prime du credit default swap. Une analyse en composantes principales des résidus et de la prime 
montre qu’il n’y a pratiquement aucune trace d’un facteur commun résiduel et suggère également que 
les variables théoriques expliquent une part significative de la variance des données. Nous concluons 
donc que le niveau d’endettement, la volatilité et le taux sans risque sont d’importants déterminants de 
la prime des credit default swap, comme prédit par la théorie. 
 
Mots clés : credit default swap, risque de crédit, modèle structurel niveau 
d’endettement, volatilité 
 
Using a new dataset of bid and offer quotes for credit default swaps, we investigate the relationship 
between theoretical determinants of default risk and actual market premia using linear regression. 
These theoretical determinants are firm leverage, volatility and the riskless interest rate. We find that 
estimated coefficients for these variables are consistent with theory and that the estimates are highly 
significant both statistically and economically. The explanatory power of the theoretical variables for 
levels of default swap premia is approximately 60%. The explanatory power for the differences in the 
premia is approximately 23%. Volatility and leverage by themselves also have substantial explanatory 
power for credit default swap premia. A principal component analysis of the residuals and the premia 
shows that there is only weak evidence for a residual common factor and also suggests that the 
theoretical variables explain a significant amount of the variation in the data. We therefore conclude 
that leverage, volatility and the riskfree rate are important determinants of credit default swap premia, 
as predicted by theory. 
 
Keywords: credit default swap; credit risk; structural model; leverage; volatility. 
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A credit derivative is a contingent claim that allows the trading of default risk separately
from other sources of uncertainty. From being a ﬂedgling market in the mid nineties, credit
derivative markets have grown tremendously over the last few years. The market exceeded
2 trillion dollars in outstanding notional principal in 2002, and it is expected to double in
size by the end of 2004. The most standard contract is the single-name credit default swap
(CDS) which accounts for roughly half of the trading activity.1 This instrument is essentially
an insurance contract against the default of an underlying entity. Compensation is paid if
a credit event occurs while in return the buyer of protection makes regular payments based
on the swap premium.
Little empirical work has been done on credit derivative markets.2 Notable exceptions
include Houweling and Vorst (2005), Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) and Longstaﬀ, Mithal,
and Neis (2004). Houweling and Vorst (2005) implement a set of simple reduced form
models on market CDS quotes and corporate bond quotes. The paper focuses on the pricing
performance of the model and the choice of benchmark yield curve. Hull, Predescu, and
White (2004) analyze the impact of rating announcements on the pricing of CDSs. Longstaﬀ,
Mithal, and Neis (2004) and Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2003) study the relative pricing
of corporate bonds and default swaps.
In the last decade, a more substantial body of empirical work has emerged on other credit
sensitive instruments, in particular corporate bonds. This work can be categorized according
to the theoretical framework it relies on. One popular approach is to use what are known
as reduced form models.3 These models exogenously postulate the dynamics of default
probabilities and use market data to recover the parameters needed to value credit sensitive
claims.4 While these models have been shown to be versatile in practical applications, they
1These statistics and forecasts are based on publications by the British Bankers’ Association . A very
similar picture emerges from our dataset. Although it includes some transactions that date back to 1995, the
number of quotes is negligible until the turn of the century. Subsequently the market experienced explosive
growth (see Figure 1).
2Theoretical work includes Das (1995), Hull and White (2000) and Das and Sundaram (1998).
3See Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and Duﬃe and Singleton (1999) for early work on this topic. Useful
surveys can be found in Lando (1997) and Duﬃe and Singleton (2003).
4Empirical papers using reduced form models to value credit risky bonds include Bakshi, Madan, and
Zhang (2001), Driessen (2004), Duﬀee (1999), Duﬃe and Lando (2000), Duﬃe, Pedersen, and Singleton
2remain relatively silent on the theoretical determinants of the prices of defaultable securities.
An alternative approach, commonly referred to as the structural approach, is to rely
on models that have evolved following Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). This
approach links the prices of credit risky instruments directly to the economic determinants
of ﬁnancial distress and loss given default.5 In particular, these models imply that the
main determinants of the likelihood and severity of default are ﬁnancial leverage, volatility
and the risk free term structure. These models have been plagued by poor performance in
empirical studies.6 P e r h a p sa sar e s u l to ft h ed i ﬃculty of implementing structural models
in practice, a more direct approach was taken by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin
(2001) (CGM), who use the structural approach to identify the theoretical determinants
of corporate bond credit spreads. These variables are then used as explanatory variables
in regressions for changes in corporate credit spreads, rather than inputs to a particular
structural model. CGM conclude that the explanatory power of the theoretical variables
is modest, and that a signiﬁcant part of the residuals are driven by a common systematic
factor which is not captured by the theoretical variables. Campbell and Taksler (2003) (CT)
perform a similar analysis but use regressions for levels of the corporate bond spread. They
conclude that ﬁrm speciﬁc equity volatility is an important determinant of the corporate bond
spread and that the economic eﬀects of volatility are large. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout,
and Weinbaum (2004) (CDMW) conﬁrm this result, and argue that option-based volatility
contains information useful for this type of analysis that is diﬀerent from historical volatility.
Our study is intimately related to these papers. Although our focus is also on credit risk,
an important distinction is that we study very diﬀe r e n td a t a—d e f a u l ts w a pp r e m i ar a t h e r
than corporate bond yield spreads. Using default swaps rather than bonds has at least two
important advantages.
First, default swap premia, while economically comparable to bond yield spreads, do not
require the speciﬁcation of a benchmark risk free yield curve — they are already “spreads”.
(2003) and Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001).
5Important examples include Black and Cox (1976), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), Geske (1977),
Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993), Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Longstaﬀ and Schwartz
(1995) and Nielsen, Saa-Requejo, and Santa-Clara (1993).
6See in particular Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984), Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1985), Lyden and
Saranati (2000) and Ogden (1987). More recently Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004) have documented the
diﬃculty of implementing these models.
3Thus we avoid any added noise arising from a misspeciﬁed model of the risk free yield curve.
The choice of the risk free yield curve includes the choice of a reference risk free asset, which
can be problematic (see Houweling and Vorst (2005)), but also the choice of a framework to
remove coupon eﬀects.
Second, default swap premia may reﬂect changes in credit risk more accurately and
quickly than corporate bond yield spreads. Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2003) provide
evidence that changes in the credit quality of the underlying name are likely to be reﬂected
more quickly in the swap premium than in the bond yield spread. Also, if there are other
important non-default components in bond spreads, their variation will obscure the impact
of changes in credit quality.7
Like CGM, CT and CDMW, we carry out linear regression analysis on the relationship
between default swap premia and key variables suggested by economic theory. Our bench-
mark results focus on ﬁnancial leverage, ﬁrm speciﬁc volatility and the risk free rate. We
run regressions on changes in premia as well as for the levels of the premia. We ﬁnd that
the estimated coeﬃcients for the three variables are consistent with theory and that the
estimates are highly signiﬁcant both statistically and economically. The size of the eﬀects
is intuitively plausible. This is true both for regressions in levels and diﬀerences. Interest-
ingly, we ﬁnd a negative correlation between CDS premia and the risk free rate. A similar
correlation has been documented for bond yield spreads by Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995)
and Duﬀee (1998). Presently, no consensus prevails as to the economic reasoning behind this
stylized fact. Our results are consistent with the implication of structural models that an
increase in the risk free rate will decrease risk-adjusted default probabilities.
T h ea m o u n to ft h ev a r i a t i o ni ns w a pp r e m i ae x p l a i n e db yt h ed i ﬀerence regressions is
higher than in existing work on corporate bond spreads. When we consider regressions in
levels, explanatory power is quite high with R-squares ranging from 50% to 75%. Thus
variables drawn from economic theory are clearly important in explaining the pricing of this
particular type of credit-sensitive instrument. This ﬁn d i n gi sr e i n f o r c e db ya na n a l y s i so f
7Fisher (1959), Houweling, Mentink, and Vorst (2004), Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2004) and Perraudin
and Taylor (2002) document the existence of an illiquidity component in bond yield spreads. In addition,
Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) suggest that both the diﬀerential taxation of corporate and
government bonds as well as compensation for systematic risk will impact bond spreads over and above the
size of expected losses given default.
4the regression residuals, which shows that the evidence for a remaining common component
is weaker than in the work of CGM on corporate bond data. We argue however that
a comparison of our results with empirical results on corporate bond spreads should be
interpreted cautiously. One reason is that the particular maturity structure of the CDS
data is likely to inﬂuence our conclusions on the explanatory power of the results.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we lay out our analytical framework.
In particular, we discuss the determinants of default swap premia suggested by existing
theory and then present our regression equations. In section 3, we present and discuss our
empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Analytical Framework
2.1 The Theoretical Determinants of Credit Default Swap premia
There are two diﬀerent approaches to modeling credit sensitive ﬁnancial instruments. One
approach is due to Merton (1974) and relies on a theoretical approach that explicitly relates
t h ec r e d i te v e n tt ot h ev a l u eo ft h eﬁrm’s assets. The ﬁrm is assumed to default on its
obligations when the ﬁrm value falls below some threshold. These types of models are called
structural models because the link with economic fundamentals is explicit. They can be used
to price credit sensitive securities such as corporate bonds as well as credit default swaps.
The second approach is more recent and ﬁnds its origins in the modeling of the risk free term
structure. This approach is referred to as the reduced form approach because the relationship
with underlying economic variables such as the ﬁrm value is not explicitly modeled.
This paper analyzes CDS premia from the perspective of structural form models. Fol-
lowing Merton’s (1974) pathbreaking work, the basic structural model has been extended in
diﬀerent ways.8 While these models typically focus on the importance of additional theoret-
ical variables, or change the precise functional dependence of default on existing theoretical
8See Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), Kim, Ramaswamy, and
Sundaresan (1993), Nielsen, Saa-Requejo, and Santa-Clara (1993), Leland (1994), Longstaﬀ and Schwartz
(1995), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Leland and Toft (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Zhou
(1997), Leland (1998), Mella-Barral (1999), Duﬃe and Lando (2000), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001),
François and Morellec (2004).
5variables, they all have in common that default and therefore the value of the default sen-
sitive security depends on a number of determinants that are central to the Merton (1974)
approach. First, leverage is central to all these models: ceteris paribus, the more levered the
ﬁrm, the higher the probability of default. Second, the volatility of the underlying assets
is an essential determinant of the value of the default sensitive security because the latter
is equivalent to a credit risk free security and a short put. Volatility inﬂuences the value
of the put option. Third, the level of the riskless rate also impacts the value of the option.
Although the correlation between the risk free rate and the bond spread is strictly not part of
Merton’s (1974) analysis which relies on a constant interest rate, the framework does predict
a negative relationship between these two variables. The reason is that the risk free rate
determines the risk adjusted drift of ﬁrm value and thus an increase in this variable will tend
to decrease risk adjusted default probabilities and also spreads. The same result has been
shown in models where the dynamics of the risk free rate have been modelled explicitly.9
Rather than carrying out a full structural estimation of any given model or set of such, we
rely on what these models together suggest are the main determinants of credit risk. We use
these variables in simple linear regressions of default swap premia on the suggested factors.
Note that although structural models have almost exclusively been used to value corporate
bonds, the implied relationship between the theoretical variables and default swap premia
is the same. This can be understood by considering the similarity between the payoﬀso f
the two types of ﬁnancial instruments. Bonds pay regular coupons and principal cash ﬂows
until default occurs. At that time, the bond will be worth a fraction of its original principal
amount.10 The seller of default insurance through a CDS (analogous to the holder of the
bond) receives regular payments (approximately the coupon rate on the bond minus the risk
free rate) until default occurs, when he makes a payment equivalent to the loss in market
value of the underlying bond - thus incurring the same loss as the holder of the bond.11
9See e.g. Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001).
10Models diﬀer in their exact technical treatment of this payment but this is without implications for the
diﬀerences between bonds and default swaps.
11In practice, the settlement in the event of default may be made either in cash or in kind. If made in cash,
a third party typically determines the post credit event market value of the reference obligation according
to a predetermined formula and the payment made will be the original principal minus this value. If the
settlement is in kind, the buyer of insurance will put the bond to the seller at par. In some cases, there may
be a certain amount of ﬂexibility for the buyer as to which bond can be delivered, much like for government
6Thus in terms of the sequence of cash ﬂo w sa n dt h ei m p a c to fd e f a u l t ,b o n d sa n dC D S sa r e
very similar and structural model variables will have the same impact on the values of both
securities.12
In what follows, we will study the link between theoretically motivated determinants of
default risk and market data on CDS premia using simple linear regression methods. In
doing so, we closely parallel the approach taken by CT, CGM and CDMW using corporate
bond data.
2.2 Regressions
According to theory, the premia on credit default swaps should be determined by the amount
of leverage incurred by the underlying ﬁrm, the volatility of the underlying assets and the
riskless spot rate. We denote the leverage of ﬁrm i at time t as levi,t and the volatility as
voli,t.W e d e ﬁne the riskfree rate variable to be the 10-year yield, denoted as r10
t .T h i s
choice is motivated as follows. Theoretical models tend to be based on the dynamics of the
instantaneous risk free rate, which is unobservable. A number of empirical studies have
demonstrated that this unobservable short rate can be thought of as being determined by
a number of factors, one of which is the yield on long-maturity bonds. In the interest of
parsimony in the empirical presentation of the results, we therefore focus exclusively on this
one proxy for the riskless spot rate in our base case regression results. The robustness of
our ﬁndings with respect to a diﬀerent choice of factor or the inclusion of additional factors
is discussed in detail in Section 3.3.
The regression suggested by theory consists therefore of regressing the CDS premium,












t + εi,t.( 1 )
bond futures contracts.
12In fact, in the absence of counterparty risk and market frictions, it can be shown that a CDS on a
ﬂoating rate bond originally issued at par can be synthesized by an oﬀsetting portfolio of this ﬂoater and
an otherwise identical credit risk free ﬂoater. The net cash ﬂows of this portfolio must equal those of the
CDS in the absence of arbitrage. See Duﬃe and Singleton (2003) for a detailed discussion of this and more
complex cases.
7We also regress the premium on each of these regressors separately to get a better idea of

















t + εi,t.( 4 )
CT and CDMW use similar regressions to investigate the importance of these theoretical
variables for the determination of credit spreads on corporate bonds. CGM focus on changes
in credit spreads, perhaps because diﬀerences are harder to explain than levels and a regres-
sion in diﬀerences therefore should provide a more stringent test of the theory. We therefore




























t + εi,t.( 8 )
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
To investigate the regressions suggested by theory, we require data on credit default swap
premia, ﬁrm leverage, volatility and riskless yields. We obtain these data from the following
sources:
8Credit Default Swap premia: We use quotes from the CreditTrade Market Prices
database for 1999-2002 corresponding to credit default swaps on senior debt. The CDS
market has experienced considerable growth over this period. Figure 1 depicts the evolution
of the number of daily available quotes.
Only the contracts on companies for which we have data in CRSP and COMPUSTAT
are used in our study. The North America Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) code
was obtained for each company from FISD and WRDS. Using the NAICS code, utilities and
ﬁnancial companies were excluded. Since there are very few quotes on junior debt, these
quotes are excluded. The amount of quotes satisfying the above criteria is 53,625. Figure 2
depicts the number of quotes as a function of the tenor. The market is clearly concentrated
on maturities around 5 years. We therefore only retain 48,626 quotes that have tenors
between 4.5 and 5.5 years. This sample represents 90.7% of all quotes.
Even though the CDS market is a worldwide market, the majority of the quotes fall
within New York trading hours. This ﬁn d i n gi st oal a r g ee x t e n td u et oo u rs e l e c t i o nc r i t e r i a ,
because CRSP and COMPUSTAT mainly contain data on US companies. From the 48,626
quotes, we selected, for each day and reference entity, the quote closest to 4PM NY time.
More precisely, we ﬁlter the quotes according to the following criteria:
• Either the time stamp is after 3PM
• or the time stamp is between 12 noon and 3PM and the time stamp on the previous
available quote is more than two trading days old
• o rt h et i m es t a m pi sb e t w e e n9 A Ma n d1 2n o o na n dt h et i m es t a m po nt h ep r e v i o u s
available quote is more than three trading days old
• o rt h et i m es t a m pi sb e t w e e n6 A Ma n d9 A Ma n dt h et i m es t a m po nt h ep r e v i o u s
available quote is more than four trading days old
• o rt h et i m es t a m pi sb e t w e e n3 A Ma n d6 A Ma n dt h et i m es t a m po nt h ep r e v i o u s
available quote is more than ﬁve trading days old.
This rule is motivated by consideration for the diﬀerence regressions. To compute the
diﬀerences in the premia, we ideally want quotes at the exact same time of the day. This
is not possible and because of sample size considerations, it is also not possible to limit
9ourselves to time stamps after 3PM. By including quotes with time stamps further removed
from 4PM, the potential for biases in the computed premium diﬀerences increases. However,
by only selecting quotes farther removed from 4PM if the previous quote is further removed
in time, we ensure that the potential bias from time stamps at diﬀerent parts of the day is
reduced.
Bid and oﬀer quotes are treated separately. As a ﬁnal ﬁlter, we only retain ﬁrms with at
least 25 quotes or changes in quotes, depending on the regression speciﬁcation. It should be
noted that the number of observations in any given regression will depend on whether it is
r u no nl e v e l so rd i ﬀerences and on whether bids or oﬀe r sa r eu s e d .T h i sl e a v e su sw i t h4 8 1 3
bid and 5436 oﬀer quotes over the whole sample period, with slightly fewer observations for
regressions in diﬀerences. The Appendix lists the companies that are included in the sample
for the diﬀerent regressions.
The data for the theoretical determinants of the CDS premia (the explanatory variables
in the regressions) are constructed as follows:
Leverage:T h el e v e r a g er a t i oi sd e ﬁned as
Book Value of Debt + Book Value of Preferred Equity
Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Debt + Book Value of Preferred Equity
(9)
The Market Value of Equity was obtained from CRSP, and the Book Value of Debt and the
Book Value of Preferred Equity from COMPUSTAT. Since book values are only available at
the quarterly level, we linearly interpolate in order to obtain daily ﬁgures.
Volatility: A time series of equity volatility was computed for each company using an
exponentially weighted moving average model on daily returns obtained from CRSP.13 In the
empirical literature on the determinants of corporate bond spreads, our approach is closest
to that of CT, who construct historical volatility based on 180 days of returns in their base
case regressions. CGM use the VIX data, which represents option-implied volatility based
on S&P 100 index options. CDMW use both volatility implied by individual equity options
as well as historical volatility.
Treasury Bond Yields: Daily data on 10-year Treasury bond yields were collected
from DataStream. We use the appropriate constant maturity index constructed by the US
13For each reference entity, volatility ht was generated according to ht = r2
t (1 − λ)+ht−1λ, with rt
denoting daily returns. In order to obtain a more precise estimate of λ, we constrain this parameter to be
t h es a m ea c r o s sﬁrms in the estimation.
10Treasury based on the most actively traded issues in that maturity segment.
Table 1 and Figure 3 provide descriptive statistics and visual summaries of the CDS
premia and the explanatory variables used in the main regressions. The CDS premium is
180 basis points on average with a large standard deviation. The explanatory variables seem
to be less variable than the CDS premium and especially the 10-year yield is tightly centered
around the mean. From Figure 3 it would seem that the high variability of the CDS premium
is partly due to the fact that the premium has been increasing over time, regardless of the
rating of the reference obligation, and that the premium diﬀers considerably across reference
obligations with diﬀerent ratings. Figure 3 also clearly indicates that the number of available
datapoints is very diﬀerent for diﬀerent reference obligations.
Because the data set has a cross-sectional as well as a time-series dimension, several
aspects of the relationship between the theoretical variables and the credit spreads can in
principle be investigated. Cross-sectional correlations indicate how credit spreads diﬀer
between companies because of diﬀerences in leverage and volatility. Time-series correlations
indicate how credit spreads change for a given company as the company’s leverage ratio and
equity volatility change. Table 1 presents some initial insight into these correlations and
the diﬀerences between the cross-sectional and time-series patterns. Time-series as well as
cross-sectional correlations between the CDS premia and the theoretical variables have the
expected sign, and interestingly for both volatility and leverage the cross-sectional correlation
is not very diﬀerent from the time-series correlation. Figures 4 through 7 provide additional
insight into this issue. Figures 4 and 5 graphically illustrate the time-series relationship with
the CDS premia for leverage and volatility respectively by averaging the variables across
ﬁrms at a point in time. Because our data are unevenly spaced, we use weekly averages. The
ﬁgures clearly suggest a positive time-series relationship between either theoretical variable
and the CDS premium. Figures 6 and 7 graphically illustrate the cross-sectional relationship
between the variables and the CDS premia by averaging the data across time for a given
ﬁrm. While the ﬁgures suggest a positive relationship for volatility as well as leverage, they
clearly conﬁrm the result in Table 1 that the correlation is higher for volatility.
113.2 Regression Results
Because the regressions (1)-(8) have a cross-sectional as well as a time-series dimension,
they can be implemented in diﬀerent ways. We ﬁrst follow CGM and present results on
average regression coeﬃcients obtained by running a series of time-series regressions for every
diﬀerent company, emphasizing time-series correlations between CDS premia and theoretical
variables. From a managerial perspective, these regressions are of most interest because they
indicate how credit spreads change for a given company as the company’s leverage ratio and
equity volatility change. Subsequently, for the levels regressions (1)-(4) we also present results
obtained using a number of diﬀerent panel data techniques. Regarding the implementation
of the regressions, note that the constant in the diﬀerence regressions is obviously diﬀerent
(at a theoretical level) from the constant in the levels regressions, which is why it is indexed
with a superscript l or d, respectively. The constant is also indexed by a subscript i, because
in the implementation using time-series regression it is diﬀerent for every company. In the
panel data implementation, this is the case when estimating ﬁxed-eﬀects but not for the OLS
panel data regression which constrains the constant to be the same for all companies.
Table 2 presents the results of the levels regression (1) and the diﬀerence regression (5).
For both regressions, we report results obtained with bid quotes as well as results obtained
with oﬀer quotes. In each case, we report results obtained using data on all companies,
and we also report results for a sample of companies with below median rating and another
sample of companies with above median rating. The number of companies included in each
analysis is listed in the third row from the bottom. The next to last row indicates the average
number of observations included in the time-series regressions, and the last row indicates on
average how much time elapses between diﬀerent quotes for the same underlying. For each
case, the top four rows list the average regression coeﬃcients obtained from the time-series
regressions. Rows 5 through 8 present the t-statistics obtained by computing standard errors
on the estimated regression coeﬃcients.
A number of important conclusions obtain. First, the estimated sign for the coeﬃcient on
leverage is always positive, as expected a priori. Second, the estimated sign for the coeﬃcient
on volatility is also always positive, as expected. Third, the coeﬃcient on the 10-year
yield also conforms to theoretical expectations because it is estimated with a negative sign.
What is even more encouraging is that the t-statistics almost uniformly indicate statistical
12signiﬁcance at conventional signiﬁcance levels. Interestingly, the few exceptions occur for
the levels regressions, not for the (more challenging) diﬀerence regressions.
The point estimates for the coeﬃcients are remarkably similar across the levels and
diﬀerence regressions, least so for the coeﬃcients on the 10-year yield. Not surprisingly,
there are some diﬀerences in the point estimates across ratings. For lower rated ﬁrms, the
point estimates for leverage and volatility are bigger than for higher rated ﬁrms. These
eﬀects are perfectly intuitive and consistent with the predictions of any structural credit risk
model. We also ﬁnd that CDS premia for lower rated ﬁrms are more sensitive to interest
rates. Again, this is consistent with the theory. It is also consistent with the empirical
ﬁndings of Duﬀee (1998) on corporate bond yield spreads.14
A ﬁnal statistic of interest is the adjusted R2. First and foremost, the explanatory power
of the levels regressions is of course much higher than that of the diﬀerence regressions. For
the levels regressions, the theoretical variables explain approximately 60% of the variation in
the premium. For the diﬀerence regressions, the theoretical variables explain approximately
23%. The R-squares for the lower ratings are always a bit higher than those for the higher
ratings, as expected. It may also be of interest that in the level regressions the R-squares
for the bid quotes are a bit higher than the R-squares for the oﬀer quotes, even though this
pattern does not show up in the diﬀerence regressions.
While the eﬀects of a change in the yield curve somewhat depend on whether one esti-
m a t e si nl e v e l so rd i ﬀerences, the results for volatility and leverage are robust across spec-
iﬁcations. This renders the economic interpretation of the point estimates of signiﬁcant
interest. Using the estimation results for all companies, an 1% increase in (annualized) eq-
uity volatility raises the CDS premium on average by approximately 0.8-1.5 basis point. For
companies with lower ratings, the eﬀect is estimated to be between 1.1 and 2.3 basis points.
The leverage eﬀect is also stronger for lowly rated companies: a 1% change in the leverage
ratio increases their CDS premium by approximately 6-10 basis points, whereas this eﬀect
is between 4.8 and 7.3 basis points when considering all companies.
Tables 3, 4 and 5 further explore these results. Table 3 presents results for regressions
(2) and (6), Table 4 for regressions (3) and (7), and Table 5 for regressions (4) and (8). The
14In a structural model, the risk adjusted probability of default is decreasing in the risk free interest rate.
Intuitively, a higher risk free rate entails a higher drift rate for the ﬁrm’s asset value and allows it to grow
its way away from ﬁnancial distress. See also Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995).
13tables are structured in the same way as Table 2. It must be noted that, in a sense, the
point estimates in these tables are of somewhat less interest than those in Table 2, because
the regression in Table 2 is the one suggested by the theory. It is therefore entirely possible
that in the univariate regressions in Tables 3 through 5, coeﬃcients are biased because of an
omitted variable argument.
Interestingly however, the signs of the point estimates are the same as in Table 2 and the
t-statistics for the time-varying regressors are signiﬁcant at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
Table 3 indicates that when leverage is the only explanatory variable, its economic eﬀect is
always estimated to be larger than in Table 2, and the same is true for volatility in Table 4,
but the eﬀects are roughly of the same order of magnitude. A comparison of the R-squares
in Tables 3-5 with those in Table 2 indicates to what extent each of the theoretical variables
contributes to the explanatory power of the regression. It can be seen that each of the three
variables has some explanatory power, even though the leverage variable clearly dominates
the other two regressors. The leverage variable alone explains between 37.1% and 45.7% of
the variation in CDS premia in the levels regressions, but only about 13% on average in the
diﬀerence regressions. Volatility explains between 23.9% and 29.7% in the levels regressions,
but only between 6.9% and 14.4% in the diﬀerence regressions. Interestingly, the 10-year
yield variable has a higher R-square than the volatility variable in the levels regression, but
its explanatory power in the diﬀerence regressions is decidedly modest.
Note that the negative correlation between CDS premia and the risk free rate discussed
above has also been documented for bond yield spreads by Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995)
and Duﬀee (1998). Presently, no consensus prevails as to the economic reasoning behind
this stylized fact. Duﬃe and Singleton (2003) state that one possible explanation for the
negative correlation is the existence of stale corporate bond prices. The spreads are measured
by taking the diﬀerence between the corporate and the Treasury yield curves; therefore, an
increase in Treasury yields might be associated with a decrease in spreads until the recorded
corporate bond price accounts for the change. Our results rule out the latter explanation
because default swap premia are not given by the diﬀerence of two yields as bond spreads
are.However, our results are consistent with the implication of structural models that an
increase in the risk free rate will decrease risk-adjusted default probabilities.15
In summary, we conclude that there are some interesting diﬀerences between the levels
15See Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995) for a discussion.
14and diﬀerence regressions in Tables 3-5.
3.3 Robustness Analysis
This Section further investigates the robustness of the regression results presented in Section
3.2. In a ﬁrst step, we estimate the regression proposed by CGM. Their base case regression
includes the explanatory variables levi,t, voli,t and r10
t included in (1) but adds a number of
other explanatory variables including
Treasury Bond Yields: We collected daily series of 2-year and 10-year bond yields
from DataStream.
The Slope of the Yield Curve: Deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the 10-year Trea-
sury bond yield used in regression (2) and 2-year Treasury bond yields also obtained from
DataStream. We use the 2-year Treasury bond yield as the level of the yield curve in order
to make the interpretation of the slope more straightforward.
T h es q u a r eo ft h e2 - y e a ry i e l d .
T h er e t u r no nt h eS & P5 0 0 : Daily data on the return on the S&P 500 was obtained
from DataStream.
T h es l o p eo ft h es m i r k : We estimate the slope of the smirk on equity options using
out-of-the-money S&P 500 American futures put options from the CME Futures and Options
Database. A number of choices have to be made as regards these calculations. First, implied
volatilities are computed using the American options analytical approximation technique
proposed by Whaley (1986). Second, we cannot simply compute the smirk using one partic-
ular maturity because the same maturity is not available on every trading day. To take into
account the dependence of the smirk on maturity, we deﬁne moneyness as ln(K/F)/sqrt(T),
were K is the strike price, F is the futures price, and T is the time to expiration. Stan-
dardizing moneyness by sqrt(T) makes the slope of the smirk (on a given trading day)
remarkably similar across expirations. Third, we estimate a linear relation between money-
ness and implied volatility.16 Robustness tests demonstrate that adding a quadratic term
does not change the results. Fourth, we arbitrarily choose 45 days as a benchmark maturity.
The slope of the 45-day smirk is then obtained from linearly interpolating the coeﬃcients
16To circumvent the noise in very deep out-of-the-money options, we ignore options whose moneyness was
lower than the median across time of the lowest moneyness of each trading day.
15corresponding to the nearest available expirations.
The motivation for including these variables is as follows. The interest rate variable
directly modeled by most of the theory is the instantaneous spot rate. It has been shown
empirically that the instantaneous rate can be explained by a number of term structure
variables. The yield on long maturities used in regression (1) is one of these variables.
Alternatively, one can use the yield on short maturity bonds or the diﬀerence in yield between
short and long maturities, which is what is proposed here. The square of the 2-year yield
is a convenient attempt to exploit nonlinearities in the relationship between term structure
variables and credit default swap premia. CGM (2001) use the return on the S&P 500 to
proxy for the overall state of the economy and the slope of the smirk to proxy for jumps
in ﬁrm value. It is clear that some of these variables are more loosely related to theory
compared to the regressors in (1). For additional motivation see CGM. Including these
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Table 6, which presents the results of these regressions, has the same format as Table 2.
The t-statistics were computed in the same fashion. One objective of this table is to verify
by means of the R-squares if the addition of these variables increases the explanatory power
of the theory. For the diﬀerence regressions, the extra variables increase the R-square by
roughly 7.5%, whereas for the levels regressions the increase in the R-square is approximately
14%. Interestingly, the increase in R-square is larger for the regressions that use oﬀer quotes.
The term structure variables are often insigniﬁcantly estimated, perhaps suggesting some
multicollinearity between them, or high correlation with another explanatory variable. The
return on the S&P 500 has a signiﬁcantly estimated negative impact on the CDS premium,
indicating that in times with high returns (good times), the premium narrows. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the ﬁndings in CGM for spreads on corporate bonds. The slope of the
smirk seems to have a minor impact on the CDS premium. Finally and perhaps most
16importantly, the point estimates for leverage and volatility are very similar to the ones in
Table 2. We therefore conclude that the magnitude of the eﬀects discussed before is robust
to the inclusion of a number of other variables. This is remarkable if one considers that the
R-square increases considerably, and that in the levels regression we have a speciﬁcation in
Table 6 that explains a large part of the variation in CDS premia. These results therefore
inspire conﬁdence in our estimates.
It could be argued that the t-statistics in Tables 2 through 6 are hard to interpret because
they are computed based on the variation in regression coeﬃcients for time-series regressions.
An alternative approach is to treat the empirical problem as a full-ﬂedged panel data problem.
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of this procedure for the levels regressions. We do not
report panel estimation for the diﬀerence regressions because we need a number of additional
assumptions regarding cross-sectional correlation patterns and autocorrelations to compute
standard errors, and the levels regressions are suﬃcient to make the point.
For all three panels in Tables 7 and 8, columns 1-4 report results for estimation of
regressions (1), (2), (3) and (4). Table 7 reports results for oﬀer quotes and Table 8 for
bid quotes. Panel A reports results for the basic OLS panel regression, Panel B allows
for reference entity ﬁxed eﬀects and Panel C includes quarter dummies. In Panel A, each
observation is treated independently and the regression constant is assumed to be the same
across companies.
The point estimates in Panel A again have the signs predicted by theory, although their
magnitudes diﬀer from the ﬁrm by ﬁrm time-series regressions in Tables 2-6. The coeﬃcient
for leverage tends to be smaller while equity volatility enters with a larger coeﬃcient. When,
as in Panel B, ﬁxed eﬀects for the reference entities are included, the parameter estimates fall
back in line with what was found in Tables 2-6, while the R-squares increase substantially.
This clearly indicates that there is a large amount of cross-sectional variation that cannot
be captured by the theoretical variables. The main eﬀect of including quarter dummies
(Panel C) is a slight increase in the R-square of the regression relative to the base case in
Panel A. This can be interpreted as suggesting that the theoretical variables explain most
of the time-series variation in the data, but the results of this regression may be hard to
interpret. The results will be aﬀected by inserting more time dummies into the equation,
and the choice of quarterly dummies is ad hoc. Note however that because we have daily data
and an unbalanced panel, there is no natural choice for the frequency of the time dummies:
17q u a r t e r l yd u m m i e sa r ea sg o o dac h o i c ea sa n y .T h et - s t a t i s t i c sa r em u c hh i g h e ri nT a b l e s7
and 8, which is not necessarily surprising because the t-statistics in Tables 2-6 are essentially
computed on the variation in the regression coeﬃcients and therefore hard to relate to the
more conventional t-statistics in Tables 7 and 8.
Despite some of the problems with the interpretation of the time dummies, the rela-
tive increases in explanatory power resulting from including ﬁxed eﬀects and time dummies
respectively suggests that the variables determined by theory may have more explanatory
power in a time series than a cross-sectional sense. In this respect, it is interesting to note
that the ranking of the R-squares for the univariate regressions on leverage and volatility
( i nT a b l e s3 ,4 ,7a n d8 )d i ﬀers depending on whether the data is treated as a collection of
time series or as a panel. In the time series case, the R-squares are higher when leverage is
used as regressor compared to equity volatility. In Panels A of Tables 7 and 8, the equity
volatilities appear to be more successful in explaining the variation in CDS premia. This is
consistent with leverage having more explanatory power in the time series, whereas volatility
is relatively speaking better at explaining the cross section. Returning to Table 1, we can see
that the reported cross-sectional and time series correlations are consistent with this obser-
vation. For leverage, the cross-sectional correlation is lower than the time-series correlation,
while it is the opposite for volatility. One possible explanation is that theoretically, leverage
does not provide suﬃcient information about the likelihood of ﬁnancial distress since it does
not convey information about business risk. Equity volatility, on the other hand, provides
information about both asset risk and leverage, and can thus be better used to discriminate
between the credit risk of diﬀerent ﬁrms.
Finally, note that the cross-sectional and time-series correlations in Table 1 also help to
explain the diﬀerences in the point estimates between Panel A of Tables 7 and 8 on the one
hand and Panel B (as well as Tables 2-4) on the other hand. The ﬁxed eﬀects regressions in
Panel B capture the time-series correlation. Because the results in Panel A capture a mixture
of time-series and cross-sectional correlation, the point estimate for leverage goes down and
that for volatility goes up, consistent with the relative strength of the eﬀects documented
in Table 1. It is interesting to note that the small diﬀerences between the time-series and
cross-sectional correlations documented in Table 1 leads to relatively large changes in point
estimates.
183.4 Discussion
It is interesting to compare these results with the results obtained for spreads on corporate
bonds by CT, CGM and CDMW. The most important observation is that our results conﬁrm
the results in these papers that the theoretical determinants of credit risk are empirically
relevant and estimated with the sign predicted by theory. With respect to the explanatory
power of these theoretical variables, a comparison is unfortunately less straightforward. CGM
use a market-wide measure of volatility. They estimate diﬀerence regressions and their base-
case regressions are the ones in Table 6. The R-squares in CGM are considerably lower.
They also obtain much lower R-squares than we do when studying the eﬀects of leverage
in isolation. Our point estimates for the eﬀects of leverage and volatility are larger than
theirs, but it must of course be noted that our measure of volatility is very diﬀerent. CT
investigate level regressions and focus mainly on the eﬀect of volatility. They also use a
historical measure of volatility and because they use panel regressions their results are most
closely related to those of Tables 7 and 8. In general they obtain higher R-squares than
we do, but this ﬁnding must be interpreted with caution because they include a number
of control variables which explain approximately 25% of all variation. The estimate of a
1% change in annualized volatility in CT is 14 basis points, considerably higher than our
estimate.
Some of the empirical results in CDMW are closely related to the ones in this paper
because they investigate the explanatory power of volatility in the absence of other explana-
tory variables. However, they do not consider the impact of leverage. CDMW use panel
regressions and the R-squares and point estimates in their base-case regressions ought to
be compared to the ones in Tables 7 and 8. It is noteworthy that their point estimates for
the ﬁrm implied volatility are very similar to the ones we obtain using historical volatility.
This is likely due to the fact that we compute volatility as an exponentially weighted moving
average, which like implied volatility is more variable than a 180 day historical average.
In summary, the explanatory power of the theoretical variables in our analysis diﬀers from
the results in the literature on corporate bond spreads, which itself contains some divergent
results. It must be noted that it may be problematic to try to relate the explanatory power
of regressions for corporate bond spreads to those for CDS premia. The reason is that the
explanatory power of the regressions depends on maturity (see CT, CGM and CDMW).
19Because the maturity of the Credit Default Swaps in our sample (roughly ﬁve years) may
be very diﬀerent from the average maturity for corporate bonds, this may compromise a
comparison of R-squares between the two markets.
3.5 Analyzing the Regression Residuals
One robust conclusion from Tables 2-8 is that the theoretical determinants of CDS premia
are estimated statistically signiﬁcantly with signs that conﬁrm our intuition and that the
magnitude of these eﬀects is also intuitively plausible. However, it is diﬃcult to determine
how successful theory is in explaining the variation in CDS premia. The R-squares of the
explanatory regressions vary considerably dependent on whether one analyzes levels or dif-
ferences, and on whether one uses panel data or time series techniques. Moreover, we do
not necessarily have good benchmarks for the R-squares, because comparisons with empirical
results for the corporate bond market are subject to problems.
We therefore attempt to provide more intuition for the explanatory power of the theo-
retical determinants of CDS premia. To understand the structure of the remaining variation
in the data after controlling for the theoretical determinants of CDS premia, we analyze
the regression residuals from the levels regression (1) and the diﬀerence regression (5) using
principal components analysis (PCA). By analyzing the correlation matrix of the errors of
the time-series regressions, we investigate if there exists an unidentiﬁed common factor that
explains a signiﬁcant portion of the variation of the errors. The structure of the data some-
what complicates the analysis, and we performed a number of diﬀerent analyses in order to
investigate the robustness of our conclusions. There are two types of complications in the
data. First, the data are non-synchronous. Second, the number of observations diﬀers
considerably by company. The ﬁrst complication causes some diﬃculties at a technical level.
The second complication forces us to make some choices regarding the use of the data.
We ﬁrst report on an analysis of the levels regression (1), using the correlation matrix of
the regression errors for the 15 companies with the highest number of observations. We limit
ourselves to a small number of companies to obtain results that are based on as much time-
series information as possible. We also analyze the correlation matrix of the CDS premia Si,t.
For premia and errors from the levels regressions, a simple approach to the non-synchronicity
problem is available. We artiﬁcially construct observations every 7 calendar days, by linearly
20interpolating from the closest (in time) two observations. This results in a balanced panel of
errors. Panel A of Table 9 shows that for the bid quote levels, the ﬁrst principal component is
fairly important, explaining 58.7% of the variation. The ﬁrst eigenvector has mostly positive
elements of similar magnitude, with a few exceptions. The ﬁrst principal component of the
errors has more diverse weights, and it explains only 32.5% of the variation of the errors.
The results for oﬀer quotes in Panel B support those from Panel A. The ﬁrst principal
component for the errors explains only 31.0% or the error variation. The diﬀerence between
the explanatory power of the ﬁrst principal component of the premium diﬀerence and that of
the errors is approximately 25%, similar to the diﬀerence in Panel A. A comparison between
these R-squares suggests that a substantial part of the common variation of the premia is
explained by the regressors.
Table 10 repeats the analysis of Table 9, using the 15 companies with the highest number
of observations, but uses the errors of the time-series regressions in diﬀerences (5). For
diﬀerences, a simple interpolation does not work because there is more than one time index.
Instead, each element of the correlation matrix has to be estimated individually. We do so
by using the procedure of de Jong and Nijman (1997).17 Because the estimated correlation
matrix is not generally positive semideﬁnite, we compute the positive semideﬁnite matrix
closest to the estimated correlation matrix according to the Frobenius-norm using a numerical
algorithm due to Sharapov (1997) and also used by Ledoit, Santa-Clara, and Wolf (2003).
Panel A of Table 10 shows that for the diﬀerences in bid quotes the ﬁrst principal compo-
nent is fairly important, explaining 50.2% of the variation, with a ﬁrst eigenvector that has
only positive elements. In contrast, the ﬁrst principal component of the errors has positive
and negative elements, and it explains only 24.5% of the variation of the errors. The results
for oﬀer quotes in Panel B are a bit weaker but support those from Panel A. In this case the
ﬁrst principal component of the errors contains only one negative element, but the weights
of the ﬁrst principal component of the diﬀerences in oﬀer quotes are remarkably more homo-
geneous. Most importantly, the ﬁrst principal component for the errors explains only 30.8%
or the error variation.
Our third PCA is closer in spirit to the one in CGM, although it is slightly diﬀerent
17Martens (2003) reviews and compares diﬀerent methods for computing covariance matrices for non-
synchronous data. His simulations show that the de Jong and Nijman (1997) method is the most reliable in
the absence of a bid-oﬀer spread. Given that we work with either bids or oﬀers, we choose this method.
21because of data constraints. CGM perform a PCA by distributing the errors of all the
companies in the sample in bins according to the maturity of the bonds and the leverage
of the issuing companies. With a balanced panel, it is straightforward to do this analysis
for diﬀerences. In our case, we do not observe the premia at ﬁxed intervals. As a result,
changes in premia and the corresponding errors carry a double time index, and it is not
feasible to assign them to bins. We therefore limit ourselves to a PCA using bins for the
levels regressions (1).
CGM construct ﬁfteen bins by classifying the companies in 5 leverage groups and the
bonds in three maturity ranges. However, because all CDSs in our sample have (roughly) a
5-year maturity, it is not feasible to use maturity as a classiﬁcation variable. Also, we have
only one kind of CDS per company, and not a collection of bonds. Therefore we construct
our bins using only the leverage dimension, so that we have 5 bins delimited by the quintiles
of the distribution of leverage of the diﬀerent companies. The time interval deﬁning the
bins is 15 days. Table 11 reports on this analysis. The ﬁrst principal component for the bid
(oﬀer) errors explains only 35.6% (36.4%) of the variation of the bins, compared to 68.6%
(66.1%) for the bid (oﬀer) quotes.
Overall, the three tables allow for a remarkably robust conclusion. The PCAs for the
levels and diﬀerences suggest that the theoretical determinants of default swap premia do
explain a signiﬁcant part of the common variation. Regarding the percentage of the variance
explained by the ﬁrst principal component in the error analysis, it varies dependent on
whether one uses bins and whether one uses diﬀerences or levels, but it varies between 20%
and 36%. A high percentage in this case would indicate that there is a lot of common
variation left which cannot be explained by on of the theoretical variables. However, we
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to draw strong conclusions from this range of numbers as to the validity of
the theoretical variables, because it is not clear what the benchmark is. Compared with the
ﬁndings in CGM, the percentage variation explained by the ﬁrst principal component in the
errors is certainly low. It must also be taken into account that the largest eigenvalues are
in general severely biased upward, as observed by Ledoit and Wolf (2004).
To further understand the nature of the residuals, we also ran regressions (1) and (5)
with a CDS market index included. One would expect such an index to have substantial
explanatory power for residual CDS premia if the variables suggested by theory are inade-
quate. Unfortunately no index is available for the CDS market over our entire sample. We
22use the TRACERS index, which is available from September 2001 to the end of our sample
and we repeat our estimation exercise with the CDS data available for this period (not re-
ported).18 It must be noted that although this covers less than half of the time period of our
CDS sample, it covers the majority of the datapoints because the number of quotes increases
through time. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that including the market index does not noticeably
aﬀect the explanatory power of the regression. We therefore conclude that these results
conﬁrm those from Tables 9-11: the theoretical variables perform adequately in explaining
CDS spreads.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Using a new dataset of bid and oﬀer quotes for credit default swaps, we investigate the
relationship between theoretical determinants of default risk and actual market premia.
These determinants are ﬁrm leverage, volatility and the riskless interest rate. We ﬁnd that
these variables are statistically signiﬁcantly estimated and that their eﬀect is economically
important as well as intuitively plausible. Moreover, the estimates of the economic eﬀects
of leverage and volatility are very similar regardless of whether one estimates on levels or
diﬀerences and regardless of the econometric methodology. A 1% increase in annualized
equity volatility raises the CDS premium by 1 to 2 basis points. A 1% change in the leverage
ratio raises the CDS premium by approximately 5 to 10 basis points. These eﬀects are not
out of line with some of the estimates available in the literature on corporate bond spreads,
even though Campbell and Taksler (2003) estimate a stronger eﬀect of a change in volatility.
While these estimated eﬀects are very robust and intuitively plausible, it is diﬃcult to
determine how successful the theory is in explaining the variation in the sample of CDS
premia. The explanatory power of the theoretical variables depends on the econometric
method and on whether one uses levels of diﬀerences. Using time series regressions the
R-square for changes in default swap premia is approximately 23%, and the explanatory
power for the levels of the premia is approximately 60%. The R-square for levels regressions
goes up to more than 70% if we add in other explanatory variables as in Collin-Dufresne
and Goldstein (2001). For a number of reasons it is diﬃcult to relate these numbers to the
18Morgan Stanley’s TRACERS index is a synthetic index ofU Si n v e s t m e n tg r a d ec r e d i tb a s e do nas e l e c t i o n
of the most liquid reference entities.
23available literature on other securities such as corporate bonds. However, our analysis of
the residuals, coupled with the high R-squares for most of the levels regressions, leads us to
cautiously conclude that the theory is successful in explaining the variation in CDS premia.
These results suggest a number of interesting questions. First, given that the variables
critical for structural models of credit risk seem to be important for explaining CDS premia,
how successful are structural models in explaining the data? One can think of the linear
regressions in this paper as a ﬁrst-order approximation to any structural model, suggesting
that structural models may work well, but CT ﬁnd that this logic does not extend to the
Merton model when explaining corporate bond spreads. Second, an analysis of the eﬀects
of volatility based on individual equity options as in CDMW may prove worthwhile. Third,
given that some of the estimated eﬀects are very similar to those estimated in the corporate
bond market, a further exploration of the interactions between the corporate bond market
and the CDS market may prove worthwhile. Houweling and Vorst (2001) and Longstaﬀ,
Mithal, and Neis (2004) document some of these interactions using a reduced-form approach.
It may prove worthwhile to explore the interactions between these markets by focusing on
structural variables.
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Figure 1: This ﬁgure depicts the daily frequency of bid and oﬀer quotes for the CDS premium
data during the period January 1999 to December 2002.































Figure 2: This ﬁgure reports a histogram of the maturities of the credit default swaps in our
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Figure 3: This ﬁgure depicts the levels of CDS premia over time and according to rating
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Figure 4: This ﬁgure plots CDS premia and ﬁrm leverage, both averaged across reference
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Figure 5: This ﬁgure plots CDS premia and equity volatilities, both averaged across reference
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Figure 7: This ﬁgure plots the ﬁrm-speciﬁc (time series) average CDS premia vs. average
equity volatility.
36Issuer Names
Bid Offer Bid Offer
ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC 1 0 1 0
ALBERTSONS INC 1 1 1 1
ALCOA INC 1 1 1 1
AMR CORP 0 1 1 1
AOL TIME WARNER INC 1 1 1 1
ARROW ELECTRONICS INC 1 1 1 1
AT&T WIRELESS SERVICES INC 1 1 1 1
AUTOZONE INC 0 1 0 1
BELLSOUTH CORPORATION 1 1 1 1
BLACK AND DECKER CORP 1 1 1 1
BOEING CO 1 1 1 1
BORGWARNER INC 0 1 0 1
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP 0 1 0 1
BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE CORP 1 1 1 1
CAMPBELL SOUP CO 1 1 1 1
CARNIVAL CORP 1 1 1 1
CATERPILLAR INC 1 1 1 1
CENDANT CORP 1 1 1 1
CENTEX CORP 0 1 0 1
CENTURYTEL INC 0 1 0 1
CITIZENS COMMUNICATIONS CO. 1 1 1 1
CLEAR CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS INC 1 1 1 1
COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES INC 1 1 1 1
COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP 1 1 1 1
COMPUTER ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL INC 0 1 0 1
CONAGRA FOODS INC 1 0 1 0
COX COMMUNICATIONS INC 1 1 1 1
CSX CORP 1 1 1 1
CVS CORP 1 1 1 1
DANA CORP 1 1 1 1
DEERE AND CO 1 1 1 1
DELPHI AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS CORP 1 1 1 1
DELTA AIRLINES INC 0 1 1 1
DILLARDS INC 1 0 1 0
DOW CHEMICAL CO, THE 1 1 1 1
DUPONT DE NEMOURS CO 0 1 0 1
EASTMAN KODAK CO 1 1 1 1
EL PASO CORP 1 1 1 1
ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORP 1 1 1 1
ENRON CORP 1 1 1 1
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP 0 1 0 1
FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES INC 1 1 1 1
GAP INC, THE 1 1 1 1
GENERAL MOTORS CORP 1 0 1 0
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 1 1 1 1
GOODRICH CORP 1 1 1 1
GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER CO, THE 1 1 1 1
HEWLETT-PACKARD CO 1 1 1 1
HILTON HOTELS CORP 1 1 1 1
HJ HEINZ CO 0 0 0 1
INGERSOLL-RAND CO 0 1 0 1
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP 1 1 1 1
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO 1 1 1 1
INTERPUBLIC GROUP COS. INC 1 1 1 1
JC PENNEY CO INC 1 1 1 1
KROGER 1 0 1 0
LENNAR CORP 0 1 0 1
LIMITED BRANDS 0 0 0 1
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 1 1 1 1
LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC 1 1 1 1
MASCO CORP 1 1 1 1
MATTEL INC 0 1 0 1
MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO 1 1 1 1
MAYTAG CORP 1 1 1 1
MCDONALDS CORP 1 1 1 1
MCKESSON CORP 0 0 0 1
MGM MIRAGE INC 1 1 1 1
MOTOROLA INC 1 1 1 1
NEWELL RUBBERMAID INC 1 1 1 1
Differences Levels
Appendix: Companies Used in Company-by-Company Time Series RegressionsIssuer Names
Bid Offer Bid Offer
Differences Levels
Appendix: Companies Used in Company-by-Company Time Series Regressions
NEXTEL COMMUNICATIONS INC 1 1 1 1
NORDSTROM INC 1 1 1 1
NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP 1 1 1 1
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP 0 1 0 1
OMNICOM GROUP 1 1 1 1
PARK PLACE ENTERTAINMENT CORP 1 1 1 1
PRIDE INTERNATIONAL INC 0 0 1 0
PROCTER AND GAMBLE CO, THE 0 1 0 1
ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD 1 0 1 1
RYDER SYSTEM INC 0 1 0 1
SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC 1 1 1 1
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO 1 1 1 1
SOLECTRON CORP 1 1 1 1
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO 1 1 1 1
SPRINT CORP 1 1 1 1
SUN MICROSYSTEMS INC 1 1 1 1
TARGET CORP 1 1 1 1
TENET HEALTHCARE CORP 1 0 1 0
TJX COMPANIES INC 0 1 0 1
TOYS R US INC 1 1 1 1
TRIBUNE CO 0 1 0 1
TRW INC 1 1 1 1
TYCO INTERNATIONAL LTD 1 1 1 1
VIACOM INC 1 1 1 1
VISTEON CORP 1 1 1 1
WAL-MART STORES INC 1 1 1 1
WALT DISNEY CO, THE 1 1 1 1
WEYERHAEUSER CO 0 1 0 1
WHIRLPOOL CORP 1 1 1 1
WILLIAMS COMPANIES INC 1 1 1 1
WYETH (AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORP) 1 1 1 1
XEROX CORP 1 1 1 1mean  stdev.  5th percentile 95th percentile
Time series
CDS premium (%) 1.80                  1.73                  0.28                       5.30                      
Leverage (%) 51.57                17.71                22.75                     79.85                     0.28 0.23
Volatility (%) 48.80                20.39                25.46                     84.09                     0.65 0.70
10 year yield (%) 4.92                  0.66                  3.85                       6.11                       -0.69
S&P Rating  7.9 2.1 4 11
Moody's Rating 8.1 2.2 4 11
Slope (%) 1.45 0.82 -0.51  2.37 0.59
2 year yield (%) 3.47 1.39 1.80 6.33 -0.68
S&P 500 1,111.84 180.87 847.76 1,436.51 -0.70
Smirk slope (%) 0.59 0.07 0.49 0.70 -0.20
VIX (%) 29.60 7.19 21.11 43.86 0.52
Correlation with CDS premium
Numerical ratings in the sample range from 1 (Aaa) to 20 (Ca) for Moody's and from 1 (AAA) to 25 (in default) for S&P.
Table 1
Summary statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for the regression variables.  It also includes numerical S&P and Moody's credit ratings.
Cross-sectionalLow   High   Low   High   Low   High   Low   High  
Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating
Coefficients Constant 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.019 0.000 0.010 0.104 -1.072 -0.492 -2.242 -0.783 -1.513
Leverage 0.072 0.041 0.056 0.060 0.035 0.048 0.076 0.051 0.063 0.100 0.046 0.073
Equity Volatility 0.011 0.004 0.008 0.023 0.006 0.014 0.017 0.004 0.010 0.023 0.007 0.015
10-Year Yield -0.307 -0.118 -0.212 -0.387 -0.169 -0.278 -0.596 -0.100 -0.345 -0.342 -0.057 -0.200
T-stats Constant 0.87 0.64 1.09 1.56 0.04 1.47 0.09 -1.81 -0.78 -1.66 -1.62 -2.11
Leverage 6.00 4.82 7.52 4.97 4.85 6.66 5.48 5.86 7.72 6.30 5.69 7.87
Equity Volatility 4.58 2.97 5.24 5.19 3.61 5.72 3.64 1.97 3.99 3.56 3.39 4.34
10-Year Yield -4.49 -2.49 -4.97 -3.13 -2.35 -3.86 -4.27 -1.29 -4.13 -2.28 -0.74 -2.35
R
2 23.3% 21.3% 22.3% 24.2% 23.3% 23.7% 65.5% 57.3% 61.4% 59.6% 52.6% 56.1%
N. of Companies 39 39 78 45 45 90 40 41 81 47 47 94
Avg. N. of Observ. 60.0 59.5 59.7 55.6 61.0 58.3 58.3 60.5 59.4 55.2 60.4 57.8
Avg. Day Btw. Quotes 19.7 19.6 19.7 20.1 19.1 19.6 20.9 19.3 20.1 20.5 19.6 20.1
All   All  
Bid Quotes Offer Quotes
All   All  
Bid Quotes Offer Quotes
Regressions in Differences Regressions in Levels
Table 2
Regression Using Variables Suggested by Theory
This table presents descriptive statistics and regression results for linear regressions using the three explanatory variables suggested 
by theory: leverage, volatility and the riskless interest rate. Reported coefficients are averages for regression coefficients from time-
series regressions using all observations on a given underlying company. T-statistics are computed based on the time-series 
regression coefficients as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001).Low   High   Low   High   Low   High   Low   High  
Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating
Coefficients Constant 0.017 0.006 0.012 0.024 0.002 0.013 -5.810 -2.298 -4.032 -7.058 -1.358 -4.208
Leverage 0.087 0.045 0.066 0.103 0.045 0.074 0.132 0.066 0.099 0.160 0.057 0.109
T-stats Constant 2.40 1.22 2.65 1.70 0.40 1.73 -4.44 -2.78 -5.11 -4.10 -4.63 -4.59
Leverage 7.63 5.92 9.14 7.07 7.56 8.82 6.78 5.90 8.44 6.63 6.81 7.88
R
2 14.2% 13.7% 14.0% 12.4% 13.7% 13.0% 44.0% 45.7% 44.8% 40.7% 37.1% 38.9%
N. of Companies 39 39 78 45 45 90 40 41 81 47 47 94
Avg. N. of Observ. 60.0 59.5 59.7 55.6 61.0 58.3 58.3 60.5 59.4 55.2 60.4 57.8
Avg. Day Btw. Quotes 19.7 19.6 19.7 20.1 19.1 19.6 20.9 19.3 20.1 20.5 19.6 20.1
Bid Quotes Offer Quotes
This table presents descriptive statistics and regression results for linear regressions using one of the explanatory variables  
suggested by theory, leverage. Reported coefficients are averages for regression coefficients from time-series regressions
using all observations on a given underlying company. T-statistics are computed based on the time-series regression
coefficients as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001).
Table 3
Regression Using Leverage Only
All   All   All   All  
Regressions in Differences Regressions in Levels
Bid Quotes Offer QuotesLow   High   Low   High   Low   High   Low   High  
Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating
Coefficients Constant 0.041 0.018 0.030 0.052 0.015 0.033 0.356 0.120 0.237 0.705 0.156 0.430
Equity Volatility 0.016 0.007 0.011 0.027 0.010 0.018 0.038 0.016 0.027 0.037 0.017 0.027
T-stats Constant 5.59 2.47 5.57 3.63 1.92 4.01 0.92 1.02 1.19 1.60 0.95 1.83
Equity Volatility 6.25 5.25 7.62 6.00 4.94 7.00 5.25 5.01 6.62 4.40 4.73 5.82
R
2 10.1% 6.9% 8.5% 14.4% 11.0% 12.7% 29.7% 24.3% 27.0% 26.9% 23.9% 25.4%
N. of Companies 39 39 78 45 45 90 40 41 81 47 47 94
Avg. N. of Observ. 60.0 59.5 59.7 55.6 61.0 58.3 58.3 60.5 59.4 55.2 60.4 57.8
Avg. Day Btw. Quotes 19.7 19.6 19.7 20.1 19.1 19.6 20.9 19.3 20.1 20.5 19.6 20.1
Bid Quotes Offer Quotes
coefficients as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001).
This table presents descriptive statistics and regression results for linear regressions using one of the explanatory variables  
suggested by theory, equity volatility. Reported coefficients are averages for regression coefficients from time-series regressions
using all observations on a given underlying company. T-statistics are computed based on the time-series regression
Table 4
Regression Using Equity Volatility Only
All   All   All   All  
Regressions in Differences Regressions in Levels
Bid Quotes Offer QuotesLow   High   Low   High   Low   High   Low   High  
Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating
Coefficients Constant 0.030 0.014 0.022 0.036 0.010 0.023 8.848 3.943 6.365 8.608 3.591 6.099
10-Year Yield -0.486 -0.285 -0.386 -0.661 -0.356 -0.509 -1.306 -0.596 -0.947 -1.192 -0.500 -0.846
T-stats Constant 5.20 1.99 4.77 2.60 1.35 2.90 9.12 5.17 9.50 6.81 5.32 8.04
10-Year Yield -5.53 -5.79 -7.51 -5.03 -4.63 -6.57 -7.86 -4.57 -8.46 -5.38 -4.24 -6.52
R
2 6.3% 7.5% 6.9% 4.7% 7.9% 6.3% 40.1% 32.6% 36.3% 28.4% 27.9% 28.2%
N. of Companies 39 39 78 45 45 90 40 41 81 47 47 94
Avg. N. of Observ. 60.0 59.5 59.7 55.6 61.0 58.3 58.3 60.5 59.4 55.2 60.4 57.8
Avg. Day Btw. Quotes 19.7 19.6 19.7 20.1 19.1 19.6 20.9 19.3 20.1 20.5 19.6 20.1
All   All   All   All  
coefficients as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001).
Table 5
Regression Using 10-Year US Treasury Bond Yields Only
This table presents descriptive statistics and regression results for linear regressions using one of the explanatory variables  
suggested by theory, the riskless interest rate. Reported coefficients are averages for regression coefficients from time-series regressions
using all observations on a given underlying company. T-statistics are computed based on the time-series regression
Regressions in Differences Regressions in Levels
Bid Quotes Offer Quotes Bid Quotes Offer QuotesLow   High   Low   High   Low   High   Low   High  
Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating
Coefficients Constant 0.014 0.010 0.012 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 12.046 2.678 7.304 6.201 2.771 4.486
Leverage 0.063 0.033 0.048 0.059 0.033 0.046 0.075 0.033 0.054 0.073 0.034 0.054
Equilty Volatility 0.010 0.004 0.007 0.020 0.006 0.013 0.018 0.005 0.012 0.022 0.007 0.015
2-Year Yield -0.115 -0.121 -0.118 -0.256 -0.143 -0.200 -1.051 -0.209 -0.625 -0.348 -0.340 -0.344
Yield Curve Slope 0.005 -0.116 -0.055 0.003 -0.104 -0.050 -0.051 -0.077 -0.064 0.150 -0.020 0.065
S&P 500 -1.924 -0.284 -1.104 -1.301 -0.034 -0.667 -1.851 -0.411 -1.122 -1.150 -0.453 -0.802
Smirk Slope 0.144 -0.150 -0.003 -0.524 0.148 -0.188 0.904 0.364 0.631 0.613 0.862 0.738
Sq. 10-Year Yield -0.115 -0.117 -0.116 0.009 0.076 0.042 0.114 0.016 0.064 0.013 0.049 0.031
T-stats Constant 1.12 1.61 1.74 -0.18 -2.23 -0.74 1.64 1.11 1.90 0.96 1.05 1.30
Leverage 5.28 3.48 6.18 4.22 4.87 5.88 4.79 4.50 6.09 4.64 5.55 6.21
Equilty Volatility 4.28 2.48 4.81 4.79 3.54 5.48 3.81 2.47 4.36 4.62 3.80 5.51
2-Year Yield -0.99 -2.88 -1.93 -1.79 -3.35 -2.67 -1.37 -1.35 -1.62 -0.50 -1.59 -0.95
Yield Curve Slope 0.03 -1.57 -0.61 0.02 -1.21 -0.49 -0.18 -0.84 -0.43 0.61 -0.20 0.48
S&P 500 -2.72 -0.90 -2.79 -1.34 -0.15 -1.33 -1.47 -1.11 -1.72 -1.10 -1.08 -1.42
Smirk Slope 0.26 -0.97 -0.01 -1.04 0.66 -0.68 1.07 1.02 1.39 0.76 2.29 1.66
Sq. 10-Year Yield -0.66 -1.48 -1.23 0.04 1.47 0.39 1.59 0.64 1.71 0.19 1.46 0.84
R
2 31.1% 27.9% 29.5% 34.1% 30.5% 32.3% 76.1% 70.6% 73.3% 75.6% 68.6% 72.1%
Number of Companies 39 39 78 45 45 90 40 41 81 47 47 94
Avg. Number of Observ. 60.0 59.4 59.7 55.6 61.0 58.3 58.3 60.4 59.4 55.2 60.4 57.8
Avg. Days Btw. Quotes 19.7 19.6 19.7 20.1 19.1 19.6 20.9 19.3 20.1 20.5 19.6 20.1
All   All  
Bid Quotes Offer Quotes
All   All  
Bid Quotes Offer Quotes
Regressions in Differences
Table 6
Regression Using the Regressors from Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001)
Regressions in Levels
This table presents descriptive statistics and regression results for linear regressions using the benchmark specification in
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001). Reported coefficients are averages for regression coefficients from time-series
regressions using all observations on a given underlying company. T-statistics are computed based on the time-series 
regression coefficients as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001).(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficients Constant 1.118 0.285 -0.608 6.209
Leverage 0.025 0.031
Equity Volatility 0.044 0.052
10-Year Yield -0.532 -0.879
T-stats Constant 6.310 4.480 -8.030 33.910
Leverage 21.610 21.910
Equity Volatility 26.550 28.890
10-Year Yield -18.430 -25.520
R
2 0.418 0.096 0.326 0.106
Coefficients Constant -1.416 -4.361 -0.015 6.264
Leverage 0.082 0.123
Equity Volatility 0.021 0.039
10-Year Yield -0.376 -0.890
T-stats Constant -6.030 -26.810 -0.190 37.890
Leverage 24.080 37.010
Equity Volatility 11.600 22.340
10-Year Yield -13.370 -27.560
R
2 0.698 0.659 0.605 0.572
Coefficients Constant -3.575 -0.841 -1.686 1.876
Leverage 0.027 0.031
Equity Volatility 0.049 0.052
10-Year Yield 0.162 -0.261
T-stats Constant -7.570 -11.470 -16.880 3.220
Leverage 23.080 22.520
Equity Volatility 26.770 26.190
10-Year Yield 1.990 -2.520
R





Panel regressions - offer quotes
This table reports our findings for panel versions of regression (1) and the three univariate 
regressions (2)-(4). Panel A reports results for OLS regressions with 
Huber/White/Sandwich variance estimates. Panels B & C report results for regressions with fixed 
effects and quarter dummies, respectively. The panel contains 5436 offer quotes for 94 different 
reference entities with at least 25 quotes each. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficients Constant 1.350 0.264 -0.538 6.211
Leverage 0.023 0.027
Equity Volatility 0.039 0.045
10-Year Yield -0.560 -0.917
T-stats Constant 8.120 4.440 -8.500 34.850
Leverage 22.330 21.930
Equity Volatility 28.280 31.040
10-Year Yield -20.140 -27.080
R
2 0.442 0.088 0.336 0.136
Coefficients Constant -0.733 -4.269 -0.074 6.534
Leverage 0.074 0.113
Equity Volatility 0.016 0.036
10-Year Yield -0.463 -0.983
T-stats Constant -2.990 -26.410 -1.150 41.640
Leverage 21.430 36.020
Equity Volatility 11.960 26.120
10-Year Yield -16.660 -31.930
R
2 0.727 0.682 0.611 0.600
Coefficients Constant -3.406 -0.854 -1.347 2.275
Leverage 0.024 0.026
Equity Volatility 0.042 0.043
10-Year Yield 0.130 -0.279
T-stats Constant -6.830 -10.510 -12.690 3.840
Leverage 23.750 22.440
Equity Volatility 27.910 27.160
10-Year Yield 1.660 -2.880
R





Panel regressions - bid quotes
This table reports our findings for panel versions of regression (1) and the three univariate 
regressions (2)-(4). Panel A reports results for simple OLS regressions with 
Huber/White/Sandwich variance estimates. Panels B & C report results for regressions with fixed 
effects and quarter dummies, respectively. The panel contains 4813 bid quotes for 81 different 
reference entities with at least 25 quotes each. Principal Component Analysis for Levels using Data on 15 Companies
of the CDS premia or the errors from regression (1) explaining the levels 
of CDS premia.  For each exercise the first two vectors and the percentage of 
the variance explained by each factor are reported.
First Component Second Component First Component Second Component
0.27 -0.15 0.30 -0.01
0.39 -0.01 0.32 0.09
-0.02 -0.49 0.15 -0.38
0.34 0.27 0.31 0.15
0.32 0.03 0.27 0.24
0.20 -0.08 0.25 -0.27
0.04 -0.47 -0.03 -0.51
0.33 -0.01 0.31 0.04
0.00 -0.40 -0.03 -0.36
0.39 0.07 0.27 0.05
0.29 -0.12 0.32 0.15
0.23 -0.31 0.23 -0.33
0.33 0.18 0.32 -0.04
0.05 -0.34 0.17 -0.38
0.08 0.09 0.31 0.15
Explained by PC:
32.5% 21.6% 58.7% 20.3%
First Component Second Component First Component Second Component
0.33 -0.08 0.32 -0.09
0.29 -0.26 0.17 0.36
0.04 -0.44 0.20 0.34
0.21 -0.12 0.32 0.03
0.37 0.05 0.32 -0.08
0.33 0.30 0.31 -0.12
0.35 0.06 0.30 -0.18
0.27 -0.03 0.33 -0.14
0.02 -0.39 -0.08 0.34
0.19 -0.28 0.20 0.37
0.05 -0.47 -0.03 0.48
0.35 0.13 0.28 -0.09
-0.13 0.00 0.27 -0.16
-0.05 -0.37 0.17 0.39
0.38 0.10 0.32 0.07
Explained by PC:
31.0% 25.1% 55.1% 24.2%
Table  9
Regression errors Premia
This table presents results of a principal component analysis using data on the 15 
most quoted companies. Principal components is applied either to the levels 
Regression errors Premia
Panel A: Bid Levels
Panel B: Offer LevelsPrincipal Component Analysis for Differences using Data on 15 Companies
of the CDS premia or the errors from regression (5) explaining the differences 
of CDS premia.  For each exercise the first two vectors and the percentage of 
the variance explained by each factor are reported.
Panel A: Bid Differences
First Component Second Component First Component Second Component
-0.47 0.19 0.12 0.53
0.41 -0.14 0.17 -0.50
-0.18 0.35 0.11 0.07
0.15 0.42 0.22 0.07
-0.17 -0.52 0.33 -0.08
-0.32 -0.16 0.18 0.43
-0.06 -0.18 0.35 -0.06
-0.37 -0.09 0.30 0.13
0.17 -0.37 0.32 -0.23
-0.27 -0.04 0.33 0.17
0.04 -0.39 0.27 -0.05
-0.12 -0.07 0.28 0.25
-0.31 -0.11 0.30 -0.23
-0.19 0.07 0.21 -0.21
0.19 0.01 0.22 0.00
Explained by PC:
24.5% 19.8% 50.2% 18.4%
Panel B: Offer Differences
First Component Second Component First Component Second Component
0.41 0.03 0.28 -0.36
0.45 -0.04 0.30 -0.32
0.43 0.04 0.32 -0.24
0.36 -0.33 0.33 -0.08
0.04 0.48 0.26 0.28
0.18 0.10 0.18 0.07
0.37 -0.07 0.19 -0.30
0.23 -0.06 0.30 0.22
0.17 0.26 0.31 0.25
0.06 0.51 0.25 0.43
-0.09 0.28 0.27 -0.04
0.14 0.03 0.21 0.24
0.06 0.13 0.02 -0.04
0.08 -0.04 0.25 -0.31
0.11 0.45 0.21 0.29
Explained by PC:
30.8% 19.1% 56.5% 15.5%
Regression errors Premia
Table  10
This table presents results of a principal component analysis using data on the 15 
most quoted companies. Principal components is applied either to the differences 
Regression errors PremiaQuintile From To First Component Second Component First Component Second Component
1st 17.3 36.8 0.41 -0.08 0.46 0.19
2nd 36.8 47.8 0.48 -0.25 0.48 0.05
3rd 47.8 59.6 0.33 -0.60 0.27 -0.96
4th 59.6 70.1 0.61 0.13 0.49 0.17
5th 70.1 91.0 0.36 0.74 0.49 0.13
Explained by PC:
35.6% 20.8% 68.6% 16.2%
Quintile From To First Component Second Component First Component Second Component
1st 15.1 34.0 0.24 0.77 0.39 -0.65
2nd 34.0 44.4 0.39 -0.62 0.47 -0.11
3rd 44.4 55.5 0.39 -0.09 0.39 0.70
4th 55.5 65.8 0.60 0.10 0.49 0.21
5th 65.8 81.4 0.52 0.06 0.49 -0.15
Explained by PC:
36.4% 24.0% 66.1% 13.2%
Panel A: Bid Levels
Table  11
Leverage (%)
Leverage (%) Regressions errors Premia
Regression errors Premia
Panel B: Offer Levels
Principal Component Analysis for Levels using Data in Leverage Bins
the percentage of the variance explained by each factor are reported.
This table presents results of a principal component analysis using data on all companies grouped in  
five leverage bins. Principal components is applied either to the levels of the CDS premia or the errors 
from regression (1) on the levels of CDS premia. For each exercise the first two vectors and 